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FRAMING THE COMMUNITY OF ISLAMIC TRADITIONALISM IN THE FACE OF THE SOCIAL CHANGES OF MODERN SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT

The wave of modernization and industrialization had a social impact on people's lives. This received a mixed response from the community of Islamic traditionalism led by Kiai. This study reconstructs the framing of the community of Islamic traditionalism in the face of the social changes of modern society, namely through the experimentation of sociological arguments. The social context of this study was conducted in the Paiton area with the character of pandalungan society, dual society, and traditional Islamic religious culture. To analyze the problem, the concept of frames is used in social action. The process of collecting data through the objectivization of participants through in-depth interviews with 3 leaders of the Islamic traditionalism community and to the followers of each community totaled 6 people. Determination of three communities as research sources based on replica models. Analysis of research data is done interpretively-reflexively. The study concluded: first, the community frame of Islamic traditionalism is dominated by community leaders; Second, the wave of modernization and industrialization has an impact on the birth of variations of the Islamic traditionalism community in terms of its form, response, and characteristics; third, there is a similarity in responding to social change, namely religious communication strategies to strengthen the goals, narratives, capital and actions of Islamic traditionalism communities, as well as being a tool to break the authority of other leaders; fourth, the language of religiousness becomes a force in mobilizing the masses and carrying out social transformation.

Keywords: Kiai, community, Islamic traditionalism, social change

1. INTRODUCTION

This study reconstructs the framing of the community of Islamic traditionalism in the face of the social changes of modern society, namely through the experimentation of sociological arguments. Analysis in reconstruction is directed to the framing practices that Kiai went through to continue to play a role and take strategic control amid dual society social change. The social context of this study was conducted in the Paiton area with the character of pandalungan society, traditional and modern community patterns in one space (dual society), as well as religious culture of Islamic traditionalism.

The identity of Islamic traditionalism as an alliance, its emergence is never separated from the space of social dynamics. Its existence is part of the response to evolving events, contexts, and narratives; Sometimes as a counterpoint to a movement, the care of beliefs and teachings, and the initiative to solve the problem of generality. The existence of Islamic traditionalism as a counterpoint is often associated with its opposition to the identity of Islamic reformism. The context in Indonesia illustrates the birth of Nahdlatul Ulama religious organization in Indonesia which identified as an alliance of traditionalist Muslims rose to match the contestation of teachings echoed by reformist Islamist groups in the Muhammadiyah organizational alliance [1]. Not only in Indonesia, but the context in India in terms of the identity of Islamic traditionalism represented by Sunni groups is also confronted by Islamic reformers who sniff out the purification of religious teachings [2]. In Australia, the conflict between traditionalist And reformist Islam also occurs despite the limited study of identity; Not to harden on social conflict [3].

The alliance of Islamic traditionalism is also studied by some researchers related to the care of teachings, especially today in interpreting religious practices related to national politics, counter-narratives against radicalism and intolerant practices, the development of opposing schools, and social life. The national political attitude of Islamic traditionalism is associated with the principle of moderation and tolerance in the face of policies and social conflicts against the birth of government

policies [4]; Its existence is also part of social control over the spread of radicalism through guidance, lectures and dialogue that are part of the arrangement of traditional ritual activities as well as through social media [5], [6]; Islamic traditionalism communities also respond to the development of opposing religious understandings, such as wahabi that enter various regions including to the community bases of Islamic traditionalism Nahdlatul Ulama by conducting various religious studies discourses in accordance with the teachings of Nahdlatul Ulama through traditional activities such as in pesantren, sholawat community, dhikr and *tarekat* [7]; The study of Islamic traditionalism that is part of social life is one of them related to the tradition of asking for water prayers and *amalan* (sacred texts to be read) carried out by the community as a matter of faith to solve life problems [8].

The response of Islamic traditionalism to social problems, one of which was contained in the results of the 1979 NU conference on *syuun ijtimaiyah*. Martin Van Bruinessen and Farid Wajidi ⁽²⁰⁰⁶⁾ noted, when the beginning of the new order, the movement of Islamic traditionalism led by the Kiai found a deadlock to gain mass support. Later on, the deadlock can be solved with an idea of mass support named *syu'un ijtima'iyah*. This kind of idea became the engine that revived the movement of Islamic traditionalism as a symbol of the power of civil society. Kiai's role in driving Islamic traditionalism as a civil society force developed into ideas that were significant enough to influence the way society interpreted Islamic religious practices. The emergence of discourse about emancipatory Islam, transformative Islam, and progressive Islam had such a significant impact especially among young academics and intellectuals [10].

Based on some of these studies, this study wants to show a different perspective in studying Islamic traditionalism. If previous research looked at Islamic traditionalism from the point of view of its existence as a counterpoint to a movement, the safeguarding of beliefs and teachings, and initiatives to solve the problem of generality, then this study focuses on the community of Islamic traditionalism in response to the social changes that occur in modern society by taking the context of Paiton society.

The development of Islamic traditionalism in Paiton driven by Kiai began from the context of social change in Paiton society in the late 19th century marked by the establishment of the forerunner of Pesantren Darul Ulum Paiton. This pesantren is known as the first pesantren in the Paiton region. Then followed by the forerunner of Pesantren Mambaul Ulum in 1928, Pesantren Nurul Qodim in 1947 and Pesantren Nurul Jadid in 1948. Since then the wave of change in people's lives is tinged with Islamic traditionalism while making Kiai the leader of the tradition replaces the ritual leader of their primitive beliefs. Although initially, the Kiai received a severe challenge from the community, especially from the thugs and leaders of public trust at that time, the Kiai was able to show that they were able to subdue the thugs and leaders of the trust at that time with the knowledge, wisdom, and magic possessed by the Kiai [11] [12].

It is not enough just to respond through the tradition movement, one of which is Kiai Zaini, founder of Pesantren Nurul Jadid welcomed the current of educational change at that time oriented to formal school education by establishing Madrasah Ibtidaiyah Agama (MIA) in 1950 and continued to also establish a formal school with a higher level until in 1968 Kiai Zaini welcomed the initiative of the east Java NU board to establish the Academy of Dawah and Education of Nahdlatul Ulama (ADIPNU) which became the forerunner of Nurul Jadid University. On the other hand, several pesantren still survive with traditional teaching and only developed formal education the majority by the 2000s [13].

The changes made by the Kiai and their pesantren institutions give meaning to the people of Paiton, that the best activity is to follow the practice of religious life and society as done by Kiai, namely following Islamic teachings that accommodate the traditions of the previous community - today better known as nu religious traditions [14]. The existence of formal education prepared by pesantren also has an impact on the way people respond to their lives with a tendency more towards modernity, although still thick patterns of NU religious traditionalism [15]. In the economic field, Kiai also introduce to the community how to trade and how to manage the product to be more productive, one of which is by introducing tobacco plants, as done by Kiai Zaini, so that until now, tobacco plants in the Paiton region became a superior commodity [16].

The second wave of change in paiton society was marked by the construction of the Steam Power Plant (PLTU) industry which began in 1983. The development of the Java-Bali electricity industry became a strong current of paiton people towards modernization and industrialization. The existence of PLTU not only changed the economic structure of Paiton society which was originally agrarian and informal towards the formal, organizational, and modern sectors but also changed the social and cultural structure of its people. Socio-cultural changes are mainly influenced by immigrants both from outside the region and from abroad. Sometimes these migrants settle for a certain period and some settle permanently due to the marital factor. The existence of these migrants is the key to the socio-cultural change of Paiton society because they tended to bring a more modern lifestyle

supported by their modern working climate as well. Urban lifestyles that tend to be elite, individual, and glamour become one of the colors that fill the social space of Paiton community, supported by facilities that strengthen the lifestyle, such as the increasing number of housing, play zones, shops, cafes, restaurants, hotels and tourist attractions [15], [17]–[19].

The trend of community change towards modernization and industrialization is further strengthened by the establishment of The Salt Warehouse Cigarette factory and several other cigarette industry supplier warehouses such as Bentoel (currently closed), Sampoerna, and Djarum. The presence of a number of these industries seems to be a new 'god' for people who can 'guarantee' the sustainability of their economic lives, while also changing the hierarchy of community client patrons. Public trust has gradually been diverted to enjoy dependence on the company even though in practice, the hardening of Kiai is still carried out.

One of the most visible examples in the changing structure of paiton society is related to the assistance of village community development. If before the existence of this industry village officials have no other choice but to get closer to Kiai, because many assistance programs launched by the government are plotted through pesantren, then with this industry village officials and their communities get other sources of income that are large enough from corporate social responsibility (CSR) corporate programs of companies, especially for villages that are in the ring of one PLTU industry. The bargaining position of village officials is strengthened by the village fund program obtained directly from the central government.

On the other hand, the impact of this second wave of current change has made Paiton society overlap in its social institutions: the meeting between traditional and modern communities in one space/region (dual society). The condition of dual society seems to make traditional society a spectator only to the pace of industrialization and modernization. Statistics show the work of Paiton people is still dominated by informal sector activities as farmers, swordsmen, and home craftsmen [20]. In addition, the impact of this current rate of inequality gives rise to social problems such as poverty, prostitution, theft, fighting between citizens, gambling, and the use of addictive substances. This social problem arises because of the unpreparedness of society to face the current changes in modernization along with the lifestyle that occurs around it.

The Kiai, as an inseparable figure in the flow of change, take steps and strategies in response to various social, cultural, economic, and political impacts. They still position themselves as worthy figures to provide guidance and be role models in the face of uncertainty and problems in life. Kiai is not alone in dealing with social problems that occur due to social change. Support the objective structure of the Paiton community in the form of Nahdlatul Ulama religious tradition and Javanese-Madura culture that puts Kiai at the top hierarchy of traditional ritual leadership in paiton society becomes the capital to organize Paiton community in a community with a pattern of Islamic traditionalism.

There are three communities of Islamic traditionalism that are seen as quite violent in Paiton. Nurul Jadid Community led by Kiai Hamid, Syubbanul Muslimin Community led by Kiai Hafidz and Mella' Ate Community led by Kiai Fayadl. The Occurrence of these three communities is inseparable from the framing implications of the situation that occurs outside the community to form the community frame. The reason is that each community has different subject matter, forms of activities, and followers. The form of community activities of Syubbanul Muslimin carries out spiritual-religious practices through *sholawat* praise, religious doctrines, and prayers recited by Kiai; Pesantren Nurul Jadid is patterned to develop the tradition of religious education and modern education in a special location called pesantren; and the Mella' Ate community conducts studies and dialogues covering agricultural, service and environmental materials. These three communities also have different followers: Pesantren Nurul Jadid is more followed by educated groups in education, especially formal education; while the Subbanul Muslimin community is more followed by the lower middle class in both economics and education; While the Mella' Ate community tends to be followed by farmers and fishermen who tend to be sovereign in agriculture and good service related to policy, relations with corporations and technology innovation.

To analyze the framing of the community of Islamic traditionalism in the face of the social changes of modern society, the concept of frames in social action takes inspiration from Goffman's work [21]. Menurut Goffman, frame adalah "kerangka penafsiran yang memungkinkan orang untuk menempatkan, memahami, mengidentifikasi dan menamai peristiwa-peristiwa yang terjadi dalam kehidupan sekitar mereka maupun dunia secara keseluruhan". Frame berperan membantu orang menyarikan peristiwa dan kejadian menjadi pengalaman bermakna, kemudian mengorganisasi pengalaman tersebut dan memberi panduan untuk bertindak [22], [23].

Based on Goffman's ideas, Snow & Benford [24] offer the concept of framing – the process of frame creation – to explain collective action. They argue that in collective action framing occurs,

or more precisely social movements are the result of framing and producing a particular frame. In a collective action, frames are created to understand events by simplifying and de-simplification what is happening "the world out there" and this simplification "aims to mobilize admirers and followers, reap support from the audience, and demobilized naysayers." [25], [26]. In other words, the collective frame of action is, first, a set of beliefs and meanings, that are action-oriented and that inspire and legitimize the action; Second, a campaign aimed at mobilizing a group of people [27].

The frame of collective action was created as part of an effort to negotiate views and attitudes toward a course that initiators of this action think needs to change. Included in these negotiations are (1) determining what or who is to blame, (2) then presenting alternative actions to be taken, and finally (3) encouraging the crowd to move together to bring about change [28]. Benford & Snow [24] refer to these three as the main roles of framing, which they distinguish as diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. They refer to these three as the main roles of framing, which they distinguish as diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing.

Regarding the main task of this framing, the initiators of action play an important role in "consensus mobilization" and "mobilization of action" [24]. Consensus mobilization encourages agreement on a problem, while mobilization of action encourages movement. It is clear here that collective action is nothing but a movement from the pulpit to the streets, from mind to hand and foot. From the pulpit, the initiator of the movement exclaimed and gave the idea to the masses for them to move down into the streets. In today's context, cyberspace and social media are both part of the pulpit as well as the streets contested by various competing frames [29].

Based on the consideration of the approach and theory used, then this study uses qualitative methods. The process of collecting data through the objectivization of participants by digging deeper through interviews with 3 leaders of the Islamic traditionalism community and to the followers of each community of 6 people. Determination of three communities that serve as research sources based on replica models [30], The use of multi-case as a replication of cases that are possible elsewhere even though it is done in one area of research. Analysis of research data is done interpretively-reflexively [31] through categorization, condensation, cross-check and review of various impressions [32].

2. RESEARCH RESULTS

The results include findings and discussions presented in four sub-chapters covering data exposure and data analysis using social action framing concepts and Bourdieu's habitus concepts. The exposure is contained in the explanation demographics and sociological patterns of the Paiton society, diagnostic framing: the dominance of community leader disposition, prognostic framing: religious communication as a strategy, dan motivational framing: religious visibility as a force.

2.1. Demographics and Sociological Patterns of the Paiton Society

Administratively Paiton District consists of 20 villages and 72 hamlets with a population of 70,191 people that continues to increase from previous years. Indications of this increasing population are due to the flow of immigrants from outside Paiton who decided to settle as residents of Paiton [20]. This population does not include immigrants who are not recorded in administrative data of residents in Paiton District but settled in Paiton for a certain period for the benefit of work and education.

Table 1. number of residents of Paiton District [20]

| | Areas (km ²) | Population | Density (population/km ²) |
|------|--------------------------|------------|---------------------------------------|
| 2019 | 53.27 | 70.191 | 1.318 |
| 2018 | 53.27 | 65.951 | 1.238 |
| 2017 | 53.27 | 64.952 | 1.219 |

Social-religious data shows that the majority of Paitons are Muslim [20] based on religious practice following *amaliyah nahdliyin* (Nahdlatul Ulama). This can be seen from the existence of the NU Branch Board spread across 20 villages and 32 pesantren that claim to be affiliated to NU which is also spread across 20 villages (Interview, Masduki, Leader Tanfidiyah MWC NU Paiton District, 27 May 2020).

Table 2. number of religious adherents of Paiton District in 2019

| | | | | |
|-------|---------|------------|-------|-------|
| Islam | Katolik | Protestant | Hindu | Budha |
|-------|---------|------------|-------|-------|

| | | | | |
|--------|----|----|----|---|
| 70.075 | 85 | 40 | 17 | 5 |
|--------|----|----|----|---|

The socio-cultural practices of the Paiton community are a mixture of NU Islamic traditions and Javanese-Madura traditions. This is evidenced by the habits of the community that can be found easily in carrying out traditions, such as the four-month content survivors, *tingkeban*, *selapanan* or *milang are*, *toron tanah*, *sholawatan*, *sarwa*, *selamatan desa*, *petik laut*, hajj pilgrimage, grave pilgrimage, *walimah nikah*, *walimah circumcision*, *manakiban*, *tahlilan* at the event of death seven days, 40 days 1000 days and *haul*. From every implementation of the tradition, the community is not absent from inviting religious figures or Kiai, either to just lead the tradition or give advice or lectures in the series of events.

In terms of socio-economic, the majority of the citizens of Paiton worked as farmworkers, farmers, traders, and fishermen [20]. Although in Paiton there are industrial companies with a fairly large scale, such as YTL, POMI, PJB which manage Paiton power plants; also a cigarette factory PT. Gudang Garam and Apache Warehouses; and tobacco warehouse owned by PT. Sampoerna and PT. Djarum, has not obtained information that mentions exactly the number of Paiton people absorbed in the industry.

Tabel 3. livelihoods of residents of Paiton District 2019

| Police/soldier | government employees | Farmer | hodge | Merchant | Home Industry | Fisherman |
|----------------|----------------------|--------|--------|----------|---------------|-----------|
| 36 | 735 | 4.002 | 19.467 | 2.072 | 179 | 1803 |

The socio-political color of Paiton society is indicated by the interests of the community, one of which is centered on Kiai. Phenomenal people come to Kiai for various needs, such as trade progress, the success of the growing season and harvest season, health, disease, child and family success, finding work, job success, and some other interests including nomination as officials in practical politics [33]. In the 2019 Probolinggo Regency DPRD legislative candidate election, for example, two candidates are recorded as residents of Paiton, namely Hafiluddin and Didik Humaidi who have strong support from Kiai in Paiton. Hafiluddin who has the background of the family Kiai Pesantren Nurul Jadid has the support of the Kiai in Pesantren Nurul Jadid Paiton, while Didik Humaidi who has a family background Kiai Pesantren Mambaul Ulum has the support of the pesantren Mambaul Ulum Paiton (Interview, Hafiluddin and Didik Humaidi, June 1, 2020). Both successfully occupied the seats of the Probolinggo Regency DPRD for the period 2019-2024.

Culturally, Paiton society consists of a mixture of Java-Madura. On the obedience side, obedience and bigotry in Kiai are not much different from the Madurese. Meanwhile, geographical factors are not the dominant determinant in characterizing the typical society. The thing that stands out is the legitimacy of religion into the mainstream driven by Kiai pesantren to make Madura society so fanatical in Kiai and religion. Similarly, due to the factor of intense interaction with Javanese culture that causes the typical *Kiai Jawa-Madura* to be more pragmatic compared to *Kiai-Kiai Madura* [34]. The nature of pragmatism also becomes the attitude of the community in addressing various problems, as well as related to interaction with Kiai. Nevertheless, many theses state that in the region known as Pandalungan, the orientation of cultural values eventually remains following Javanese traditions, even said Madura culture is a sub-culture of Javanese culture although in some ways it has different actions [34][35], As in terms of dealing with and treating them.

In this area of settlement, there is seldom a conflict between ethnic groups. Conflicts that occur and may occur, due to the roots of conflict in the form of social jealousy nuanced economic, political, indigenous, and not native, or religious nuances. In the next development, the culture of dissing is very loaded with the nuances of Islam. This happens because in this region Kiai not only becomes a role model, but also a figure who has strong roots in some political forces [36].

2.2. Diagnostic Framing: Dominance of Community Leader Disposition

This discussion directs diagnostic framing in the three communities of Islamic traditionalism in Paiton using the concept of Bourdieu's habitus through his tools in the form of disposition [37]. Habitus is a disposition that directs social actors to perform perceptions and responses in a special way to the surrounding environment. When there is a social dynamic, habitus is what determines the perception and response of Kiai and followers so that they can take action in playing economic capital, symbolic capital, cultural capital, and social capital. Thus habitus also serves to determine the level of ability of social actors in playing capital to get a position in the arena [38].

Diagnostic framing in the case of the Community of Islamic Traditionalism in Paiton found a pattern of dominance of Kiai's disposition as a community leader. Partisanship on community goals, perceptions, responses, and social logic built in the community is a continuation of the disposition of community leaders in this case is Kiai. The tendency of each community to have a different path as a representative of the purpose is constructed in the habitus of each Kiai and follower with different characteristics. Kiai Hamid through the Nurul Jadid community wants his followers to be ready with all the changing times, so it is necessary to guide mental readiness and skills.

This path is the distinction [37] Kiai Hamid wants his community to be systemically organized and networked to familiarize followers in facing future challenges in a planned and measurable manner. In contrast to the path taken by Kiai Hafidz, the Syubbanul Muslimin Community which he formed focuses on inviting the community to contrast sholawat and provide religious guidance through lectures, so that the tendency gives birth to variations of sholawat and packaging of different activities aimed at attracting people following this community.

In contrast to Kiai Hamid and Kiai Hafidz, Kiai Fayyadl saw that the problem facing society today is an unfriendly life situation resulting from industrialization carried out by certain elites in the oligarchy group. People who are already in the middle-class position are preoccupied with their respective targets and jobs, so forget that around them there are *mustadlafiin* (people who are deliberately weakened by the structure).

Likewise, most Kiai that are currently busy with building pesantren institutions, come to the community bringing government projects that tend to be institutional, so according to Kiai Fayyadl is not easily accepted by the community as part of the awareness of building a humanist civilization because it forgets the roots of traditions that exist in society.

Meanwhile, the follower sees himself with a tendency as a follower who is present in the community to absorb the disposition of the Kiai that gives the result to distinction in practice. The disposition of followers affects the role and position of followers placed in a community arena (for the discussion of "positions" will be reviewed specifically in the next sub-chapter). But in this study, captures that the tendency of dispositions in the three communities discussed here signals that mastery of disposition is in the Kiai. Although there is a discussion room and giving opinions on discourses in the community as described in the Nurul Jadid and Mella Ate Community the follower serves as a distributor of Kiai disposition, representing Kiai speech to be conveyed to other followers. For example, the opinion conveyed by Huda, the trust manager Kiai Fayyadl in *Mella' Ate*.

If previously described the characteristics of disposition, here also explained disposition has a function as perception and response [37]. As explained, in the community, the disposition of Kiai becomes strong influences the perception and response of followers because there are more opportunities to provide perception and response to events that occur in the community as well as those outside the community. In the Subbanul Muslimin Community for example the opportunity to perceive and respond to any event can be poured through a one-way lecture to followers. Likewise, in the Nurul Jadid and Mella' Ate Communities, the opportunity to give directions both in the board meeting and to followers directly can be arranged through the mechanism of a series of events that have been set up in advance.

The thing that distinguishes from perception and response in the discussion of this community is at the level of each community. These three communities have different perceptions and responses in response to the social problems of society at large and specifically to followers. Kiai Hamid through the Nurul Jadid Community perceives the challenges of the future with a very rapid flow of change that must be responded to by institutional (systemic) and networked work. Kiai Hafidz perceives the moral problems in society must be responded to by bringing people closer to religious traditions, namely prayer and listening to religious lectures that are packaged as entertainment. Kiai Fayyadl perceives the problem of a class-class society that tends to be socialized must be responded to by bringing to life traditions that can anticipate the marginalization of certain classes in society into multicultural societies. These responses and perceptions are at once characteristic of the tendencies of each community and color the tendencies of followers in it.

These responses and perceptions stem from skills, creativity, and a legacy that is constantly repeated in the community by both Kiai and followers, thus giving birth to a personality complete with ethos, a framework of interpretation, social tools, and direction of social orientation. Together with other individuals form a social logic that is reflected in lifestyle and opinion [39].

The source of skills, creativity, and heritage reflected in Kiai and followers in the Nurul Jadid Community comes from religious doctrines, combined with modern traditions of pesantren and education, and the ability to cultivate organizations and applied skills to survive in imagined conditions will continue to change, thus forming personalities with an independent work ethic, having a framework of interpretation from sources that have been taught with socialist tools. Systemic and networked breast

milk, as well as the direction of social orientation that is accommodative in the times but still maintains the principle in choice. Lifestyle and opinions are highlighted with formal-institutional attitudes balanced by moderation in diversity.

In contrast to the Muslim Syubbanul Community, the source of skills, creativity, and heritage of religious doctrines and traditions for the love of sholawat, combined with modern Islamic art and popular song singing, as well as utilizing multimedia technology, thus forming a personality with a work ethic that is willing to sacrifice to echo the doctrine religion, especially *sholawat*, has a limited interpretation framework on religious lecture material with random socialization tools, as well as the direction of social orientation on the hope of salvation in the world as well as being eternity with the love of sholawat and Kiai. The lifestyle side is shown by the crowd and the attributes of sholawat love, and the opinions echoed are with *sholawat, maksiat minggat* (Bad behavior goes away).

Similarly, the Mellat' Ate community through its Kiai and followers tend to have sources of perception and response derived from the experiences of oppressed grassroots communities, theology of liberation extracted from Islamic teachings, local wisdom and universal wisdom as well as socio-critical theories with emancipatory aims, thus shaping a person's personality. which is militant and sided with the oppressed groups, has a progressive interpretation framework with the tools of socialization of cultural networks, as well as a social orientation direction for real action for change by advocating the end to the root of the problem that becomes a social problem. The lifestyle side is shown by proletarian tendencies, as well as opinions about progressive Islam.

2.3. Prognostic Framing: Religious Communication as a Strategy

The study of community framing pays more attention to the process of action strategy, in this process framing refers to deliberate (making considerations), utilitarian (designing to be interesting) and also directs to community goals, in the frame of development and also disseminated to be able to achieve a certain goal, to be able to take new members, support mobility, and also can obtain their resources, in the strategic efforts of organizations in the community to be able to achieve a certain goal. Combine the interests of the community and understanding the community followers who will become resources in community activities as part of the "frame alignment processes"[24].

In the case of this community of Islamic traditionalism in Paiton, prognostic framing leads to religious communication strategies used by Kiai in the community. The three Kiai in this discussion can be seen in different patterns in implementing the religious communication strategy. The difference in the implementation of this strategy is also a peculiarity of each community if it is associated with the struggle to get a position in the Paiton community.

So why is religious communication a strategic choice? Kiai Hamid, Kiai Hafidz, and Kiai Fayyad's answers are simple: "because we live in a religious society". But the analysis isn't that simple. The author sees the malleability of religious doctrines to be communicated to followers, meaning that religious identity can easily at the same time become a cultural identity as occurs in discourses and symbols that dominate in the community, even according to [40]. There is no evidence that the influence of religion in any tradition is diminishing. Therefore, this dissertation sees religious communication or religious communication as the right choice used by Kiai as a strategy of dominance in the community.

The use of religious communication as a strategy is also seen as a tool to break other authorities that erodes the authority of the Kiai. Along with the current of the second wave of changes that drove the change of Paiton society towards modernization and industrialization, there was a counter authority from among entrepreneurs of the Steam Power Plant (PLTU) industry and cigarette factories. On the other hand, village policy reforms that lead to village independence in managing village funds as well as the support of corporate social responsibility (CSR) program funds from the PLTU industry and cigarette factories in the Paiton region for village development, gave rise to counter authority from village officials. This social change also changed the hierarchy of community client patrons towards Kiai. The Kiai must choose to face or be committed to the authority of this counterpoint. Beyond the discussion of whether to choose between facing or side by side with these two counter-authority—although these three Kiai choose to use both attitudes, excluding Kiai Fayyad who chooses an attitude of always resistant to the company these—Kiai have more bargaining power in the presence of followers; Bargaining power that is not possessed by other authorities, namely the authority to use religious communication. Followers believe that no higher authority has the right to express the religious language they believe in except Kiai. At the same time, Kiai is still declared entitled to talk about the company or the management of the village depending on the capital owned by Kiai about the two arenas. Implicitly in front of his followers, Kiai stated that Kiai who has the authority to talk about religion with expressions, for example: "if learning religion must have a teacher and should not carelessly choose a teacher. Choose a teacher who is alim, clear scientific origin, an expert of worship

and understanding of inner knowledge". Strictly speaking, this kind of authority will not be possessed by the authority of the Kiai counterpoint. The bargaining power of his followers by presenting himself as an authoritative figure using religious communication is in line with Bourdieu's assertion that the language used by social actors represents his authority [41]. Some people are authoritative in disclosing the language and some people are considered dubious in the disclosure of that language.

In detail, how do these Kiai implement religious communication strategies in front of their followers? Kiai Hamid one of them uses discourse about systemic models and the network applied in his community is for *tafaqquh fiddin* (strengthening construction, systems, and mechanisms in religion) and *indzar* (networking in the struggle to guide society). This discourse was raised by Kiai Hamid from the Qur'an Surah Attaubah: 122. This discourse is often raised and emphasized in meetings with structural officials in the Nurul Jadid Community and directly to followers, so it will appear that the systemic and networked culture in the Nurul Jadid Community is also an identity of religiousness attached to Kiai Hamid and his followers.

Likewise with Kiai Hafidz raised the sholawat discourse as part of the civilization of public safety both for world affairs and for the affairs of the afterlife. Observing the various tendencies of religious development to date in its cosmic dimension tends to integrate communication in the material order [42]. One of them is with the appearance of sholawat texts. The cosmic dimension of religion has become a tradition that continues to live with society into a religious identity as well as a cultural identity.

Similarly, the discourse raised by Kiai Fayyadl in the Mella' Ate Community. The texts of the Qur'an, hadith and we yellow become the basis in creating the identity of the community that has a sensitivity to social problems, as several times conveyed to followers in the wake of the figures of farmers and fishermen desired in the Quran in Surah An Nahl verses 10-14, Quran Surah Saba verse 33 which is about social relations dependency involving groups that are deliberately weakened and groups that regulate weakening by making dependent on attenuated groups, or Surah An Nahl verse 90 which he used as a reference for the idealization of Islamic political economy.

Religious communication is potent because it is effective especially in uniting people's beliefs with their actions, their ideas with their social lives. After all, religion assumes the role of ideology as a system of ideas that explains and legitimizes the actions and interests of a particular sector of society [43]. This can be seen from the tendencies of followers, such as Ponirin (Followers of Nurul Jadid) who believe that his role in the Nurul Jadid Community as a caretaker who helps Kiai Hamid in managing the community is part of an organized fight for a better life of nation and religion. "Disorganized good will be defeated by organized evil," Ponirin said. Likewise with Shakur (Community of Syubbanul Muslimin), his willingness in following and assisting Kiai Hafidz in the stewardship of the community to be part of the lively get used to sholawat and get help from the Prophet Muhammad for salvation in the world and eternity. Huda (Komunitas Mella' Ate) who stated his participation in helping Kiai Fayyadl to develop the community is part of practicing Islamic teachings in activating sensitivity to social problems.

The context of religious communication in the community as a strategy is closely related to language as a practical taxonomy. The use of religious communication in the community has a sacred meaning as expressed at the beginning of this discussion because it is closely related to the question of belief. In general, the practical taxonomy attached to the common sense of followers are the themes conveyed by Kiai related to communicating the building of the meaning of life in a simulated community through teachings; like the survivors and the wretched, the lucky and the losers as well as the noble and the despicable.

The building of the meaning of life is not just anyone can be trusted as a person who has authority in expressing it, because in the belief of the followers of this problem is dealing with the problems of life as a survivor or a wretched person, both in the world and when responsible before God. That's why a guide is needed. According to the beliefs of the right guiding, followers are Kiai. This can be proven by the revelation of Shakur.

According to Syakur, although the same theme, expressed by different people, followers will not respond with enthusiasm as when Kiai delivers, because from the beginning the presence of followers in the community has believed Kiai as a guide to salvation, not others. This is where it becomes a bright spot that Kiai in the community has the discretion to determine the themes given to followers, thus becoming the dominant texts that fill the space of the meaning of the lives of followers.

The dominant texts raised in the Nurul Jadid Community have a social-educational-political dimension about the generation of fighters who are mentally prepared and the skills to live usefully amid society become anything based on the doctrine of *al wa'yul khoms!Panca Kesadaran Santri* (Five Santri Consciousnesses) which contains: religious awareness, knowledge consciousness, organizational

awareness, national and state consciousness, and community awareness. As a doctrine, Panca Kesadaran Santri is the spirit of all activities in the Nurul Jadid Community. It is incumbent upon all the administrators in the community to preserve this doctrine in every activity. Of course, it is not arbitrary for the managers in providing an interpretation of this Santri Consciousness Panca. There are control rooms conducted by community leaders in describing them, through briefings in every meeting held both on a limited scale of leadership and large-scale all managers, through teams formed specifically to study contextual interpretations by output academic manuscripts, and through studies filled directly by Kiai Hamid. As a continuity in dis instituting this doctrine, students are allowed to examine more broadly the values contained in this doctrine, while implementing it in daily life with the direction of managers.

In the Community of Syubbanul Muslimin the dominant texts raised with a socio-cultural dimension of the imagination of salvation for its followers with always love sholawat, the importance of sholawat communities such as Syubbanul Muslimin, the importance of being present and alms to enliven the sholawat community, the importance of learning to people who have knowledge and *nasab* (descendants) connected to the Prophet Muhammad SAW. The charity of nahdliyin and the importance of sincerity of the intention of worship is not because of anyone but because of Allah.

While in the Mella' Ate community the dominant texts are built with economic-political dimensions about the injustices that many grassroots communities such as farmers, fishermen, and workers. On one occasion Mella' Ate meeting, for example, Kiai Fayyadl described how the figure of farmers and fishermen was desired in the Qur'an. Then explained the Quran Surah Nahl verses 10-14 (Delivered Kiai Fayyadl in the study of Mella' Ate, June 19, 2020). Likewise, when describing the facts in the wider community about dependent social relations involving deliberately weakened groups and groups that regulate weakening by making dependent groups weakened by describing the Quran Surah Saba verse 33 (Delivered Kiai Fayyadl in the study of Mella' Ate, July 25, 2020). Likewise, when responding to the economic development of Islam, Kiai Fayyadl describes the Quran Surah Nahl verse 90. Islamic political economy should move within the limits of justice (*'adl*), humanize (*ihسان*) and prosper society (*i'ta'*) instead of being exploitative (*fahsyah*), plunge (*munkar*) and overreach (*baghyu*). He said the reality that turned away from the economic goals of Islam was also widely curated by Muslims themselves such as in countries that feel Islamic and a country that is majority Islamic (Kiai Fayyadl said in the study of Mella' Ate September 17, 2020, at the homes of citizens).

In summary, the dominant discourse class of religious communication in each community as a strategy that strengthens the Kiai position among followers as the following table :

Tabel 4. discourse of religious communication 3 communities

| COMMUNITY | DISCOURSE | DIMENSION |
|----------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| Nurul Jadidi | Systemic Generation | Social-Education-Politics |
| Syubbanuli Muslimini | Imagination of Salvation | Socio-Cultural |
| Malla'i Ate | Inequity | Economics-Politics |

This difference in discourse and dimensions within the scope of the community reaffirms Bourdieu's view of the interconnectedness of strategy to habitus and the arena. Bourdieu's understanding of strategy as an intuitive product of social actors' understanding of the rules of the game in a given space and time [44]. Showing the motion of three Kiai in these different communities, it intuitively gives birth to different religious communication because it occurs in different spaces. Space that has been formed autonomously through the reciprocal dialectic between habitus and arena (with all structural and position devices) in a relatively arbitrary time trajectory is suspected by Bourdieu as an autonomous condition with specific capital and a specific strategy, therefore in fact the different community characteristics of its followers are suspected by each Kiainya — with their specific capital following the expectations of followers — giving birth to discourse. certain (as in table 4) in a special space or dimension, which between one community and another cannot be applied the same discourse because it has different dimensions so that this situation of difference gives birth to different symbolic Kiai power: Nurul Jadid community with a generational discourse that works systemically surrounded by the symbolic power of intellectual and networked Kiai; The Community of Syubbanul Muslimin with discourse developed in it in the form of the imagination of salvation surrounded by the symbolic power of populist Kiai; While the Mella' Ate Community with a discourse of injustice of the ruling elite and businessmen is surrounded by the symbolic power of advocacy.

Categorize each of these symbolic powers with consideration of followers' admiration for the proud Kiai figure and Kiai's ability to adjust between capital and habitus in the community. Kiai Hamid with his ability to organize education in Nurul Jadid Pesantren along with the extensive network owned both in the world of education and politics can practically dominate discourse about the generation of systemic and networked work in the socio-education-political dimension, among the characteristics of Nurul Jadid followers with networked intellectual habitus; Kiai Hafid with his ability to discuss the discourse of salvation through religious doctrines and traditions through an approach that according to relatively entertaining followers can dominate the discourse of the imagination of salvation through the socio-cultural dimension, among the characteristics of followers of Syubbanul Muslimin who refuse to think too complicated about the issues discussed by intellectuals and politicians, thus making Kiai Hafid known populist, melted and light about the discourse he delivered; And Kiai Fayyadl with the intellectual ability to dismantle the establishment regime along with a network of non-governmental organizations and advocacy groups can dominate discourse on the inability of rulers and entrepreneurs through the economic-political dimension, among the characteristics of Mella' Ate's followers who admire advocacy issues.

2.4. Motivational Framing: Religious Visibility as a Force

This discussion provides an affirmation that what occurs in the framing of the community of Islamic traditionalism carried out by Kiai and his followers is a more specific form of the practice of practicing religion in public spaces. Titus Hjelm [45] In his book 'Is God Back? : reconsidering the new visibility of religion' revisits the debate that has continued to repeat itself to this day about the 'return of religion' to European public spaces. Hjelm saw that there was widespread confusion between religious and religious practices that had a greater impact on contemporary society. The questions that arise are what does 'new visibility of religion' mean, how religion is contested and renegotiated in the public arena—or rather, in different societies—and what impact this struggle has on society, the state, and religion itself. This question was ultimately answered by Hjelm who revealed that what happened to European society is a 'secular return' of religion, in the sense that religion is relevant to public discourse when religion has an impact on social problems or is useful to solve social problems.

The situation of European society that became Hjelm's study was inseparable from the will of the currents of politics that affirmed the relationship of religion and public space in the concept of secularization. The existence of religious leaders is needed in connection with the private sphere of faith or if outside it is to solve social problems that bring religious institutions so that in the context of European society the existence of religious leaders is needed only if it has to do with the problem of faith or in the social framework as a community contest to social problems faced if society itself associates the social problem with the problem of faith.

The concept of secularization echoed in the West was denied by their scientists. Peter L. Berger, the late 20th-century sociologist of religion, who was initially the single most influential proponent of the secularization thesis, later, turned into a spokesman for desecularization and eventually refuted his own earlier work. In the 1970s Berger began to question his earlier views on secularization outlined in *The Sacred Canopy*, later reinforced again through his *Desecularization of the World*. In the paper, Berger admits that his secularization thesis is wrong and that the world is as 'deeply religious' as it is [46] [47]. Religious resilience and revival, according to Berger, is a global phenomenon and one should seek secularization in elite spaces rather than in the world at large. The existence of this paper does not want to debate it, it just wants to assert that religion however with a different intensity its presence is inevitable in the midst of society.

The situation that is diametrically different from European society is what happens to Middle Eastern societies. In some countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Iran since the beginning has been made Islam the basis of statehood including also making religious leaders the leader of the country. Religious leaders are community leaders to deal with state and social issues. In some other countries in the Middle East, such as Egypt and Turkey, efforts have continued to overthrow secular power within the framework of the Islamic populism movement [48]. As a result, in Turkey, it succeeded and in Egypt, it failed.

Another thing with the Indonesian context. Efforts to make religion the basis of the state since the beginning of the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia always get a stalemate and opposition even from the mainstream of Muslims in Indonesia such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) [49]. The existence of religion in Indonesia is as a value in the public sphere to create a civilized life, not as a formal legal in the form of a sharia state. In this context, religious leaders do not appear in the label of formal leaders of statehood but move in the cultural realm. Religious leaders as well as social (cultural) leaders but not as government leaders, although some of them occupy important positions in the

government. The existence of religious leaders occupying the government, even today is still a debate because it is considered to be able to neglect its main function as a guide to the people [50].

Analysis of the role of religious leaders in the context of Indonesianness can be observed through social practices whose functions are seen as religious leaders as well as social leaders. Kiai's ability to read the impact of social change around them, gaining appreciation from the community to guide them to have an ethical handle as well as a technical handle (the ability possessed by some Kiai) in dealing with the flow of social change that is laden with uncertainty. The religious language used by Kiai can bring the problems faced by his followers — even the problems that confuse at all while making the decline of life — into a flexible, aesthetic, and ontological space through conceptualizing the language of total surrender and total patience, as well as the conceptualization of revival (*jihad*) that encourages followers to remain optimistic in the face of life's problems. As if to be the cure of all ills, the conceptualization of patience in religious language has changed the dimension of the chaos of life into the dimension of tranquility, while the conception of *jihad* becomes a powerful lighter to encourage unity under the banner of the Kiai. The concept of *jihad* and patience with all kinds of contextualization in dealing with the problems of followers' lives, becomes a powerful weapon for Kiai to get the attention of his followers, as well as become a kind of 'hammer mace' for other authorities because of the authority attached to Kiai in revealing religious language that is not owned by the authority of other leaders.

The visibility of religion in the context of this Kiai power is seen as having massive potential for social transformation. The language of religion becomes the power of Kiai to move followers in one command, and make something that was originally seen as profane into a sacred one; Make something that was originally seen only as a mechanism of life into a living belief. It is absent from the life of secular society as in Europe.

The question is, isn't that such a model of religious visibility giving a big space in a person's social practice to extremism and fanaticism in the name of religion? In leading the people, the NU Kiai is based on views formed by science. Performed by the intellect in building the civilization of the people, not by an ideology [51]. In contrast to other Islamic groups, nu Kiai develops their scientific tradition with plenary. Its keparipurnaa is derived from the teachings of *tauhid*, *fiqh* and *tasawuf* [52]. These three traditions become three main things in considering the future of the human relationship with others. The Kiai is responsible to God (*tauhid*) in carrying out the mandate to manage (*fiqh*) the world for the sake of mutual welfare in a wise way (*tasawuf*) [53].

From these three teachings, the Kiai give meaning to social practices aimed at *maslahah* (common good), the main concept that is at the core of every set of laws and policies in leading the people. In setting the direction and carrying out the decree towards the *maslahah* cannot be separated from the attitudes that must always be considered, including *tawasuth* (moderate) *tawazun* (balanced), *tasamuh* (tolerant), *i'tidal* (fair) [54]. At the same time in creating peace of the nation and the world, it is very important to understand the concepts proposed by Kiai Ahmad Siddiq, namely *ukhuwah Islamiyah* (Islamic brotherhood), *ukhuwah watoniyah* (national brotherhood), and *ukhuwah basyariyah* (brotherhood of humanity) [55]. .

These guidelines and means are believed to be principles in leading followers in a mannered, peaceful, dignified, and civilized manner. So that the idea of realizing the "representative" of Allah's will in the form of community welfare and religiosity following the concept echoed about *izzul Islam wal muslimin* (the might of Islam and Muslimin) [56]. These principles are what distinguish the movement of the Kiai from other Islamic movements, especially those that occur in the Middle East. The principle held by Kiai through hereditary teachings is with the position of not taking a face-to-face attitude with any entity, instead of more accommodative if it leads to the welfare of followers both spiritually and socially.

3. CONCLUSION

An analysis of the framing of traditionalist communities in the face of the social changes of modern society states the following conclusions:

First, the frame built on the community of Islamic traditionalism in the face of the situation around it is still dominated by community leaders, so the goals, perceptions, and social logic formed in the community are part of the disposition of the community leader. **Second**, the wave of modernization and industrialization had an impact on the birth of a variety of Islamic traditionalist communities in terms of their form, response, and characteristics. **Third**, although there are differences in response to the wave of social change of modern society, there is a similarity of strategy, namely religious communication as a strategy in strengthening the goals, narratives, capital, and actions of Islamic traditionalism communities, as well as being a tool to break the authority of other leaders. **Fourth**,

Kiai as the leader of the Islamic traditionalism community can express the language of religiousness into the social space so that it becomes a force in mobilizing the masses and carrying out social transformation. The language of religion becomes the power of Kiai to move followers, as well as legitimize something from profane to sacred; From a living mechanism to a life's belief. It is absent from the life of religious leaders in the context of secular societies such as in Europe. This ability places Kiai as a religious leader as well as a social leader.

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